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Linking active and activist citizens: electoral change and the Bosnian 
plenums 
Abstract: This article will examine whether the demands for social justice during 
the citizen-led assemblies (“plenums”) in February 2014 in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH) triggered electoral change in cantonal elections in the Bosniak-Croat entity 
(the Federation of BiH, or FBiH). Extant analyses underline the perennial 
weakness of Bosnian civil society, and the stasis in the ethnified political party 
system, even in the wake of the protests in 2014. However, these studies only 
look at the aggregate level and do not differentiate between places where 
plenums were established and those where they were not. To address this gap, the 
present article will differentiate, following Engin Isin, between “active 
citizenship” and “activist citizenship” as the basis for the conceptual framework. 
A difference-in-differences analysis will be employed using municipal-level 
FBiH cantonal election results from 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018. There are two 
main questions in the study. First, was there a significant electoral change in 
municipalities with plenums compared with places without a plenum? Relatedly, 
did the change differ amongst the main parties? The article will thus link active 
and activist citizenship in the post-conflict and post-socialist setting of BiH. 
Keywords: citizenship; activism; protest; elections; Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Introduction 
The closure of privatised factories in February 2014 in the north-eastern Bosnian town 
of Tuzla first triggered protests, and then the establishment of citizen assemblies (called 
“plenums”) in nearly two dozen locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The events in 
BiH were the first occurrences of post-war citizen-led mobilisations in the country not 
focused solely in the capital city Sarajevo. Moreover, given the deep entrenchment of 
ethno-national politics, intensified by political elites stoking inter-ethnic distrust by 
invoking the wars of the 1990s, it is especially surprising that the mobilisations in 2014 
were framed in universalist, non-ethnic terms. 
The events in BiH can also be placed in a slightly broader context of 
progressive, non-nationalist citizen-led mobilisations across post-socialist Europe. 
Beissinger et al (2014) refer to the upsurge of citizen dissent in the region over the past 
decade as the “end of patience”, as an end to a quiescent population that was willing to 
endure political, social, and economic hardship in pursuit of the transformation to a 
liberal-democratic (market-economy) polity. This applied to those countries that 
experienced: non-violent popular revolutions in 1989 (Central and Eastern Europe); 
post-conflict internationally-led reconstruction and reform (former Yugoslavia); and 
elite-led dissolution (former Soviet Union). This stands in contrast to the extant 
literature positing that Eastern Europe suffers from a weak civil society (Howard 2003). 
That is not to say that BiH and other cases of protest and direct-democratic 
citizen assemblies are simply cases of hitherto disengaged populations catching up with 
modes of Western activism. On the contrary, the mobilisations that have occurred in 
BiH, elsewhere in Southeast Europe (SEE) (Fagan and Sircar 2017), and other parts of 
post-socialist Europe are local manifestations of global phenomena evident since the 
Global Recession in 2008 (Dolenec, Doolan, and Tomašević 2017, 1402). The modes of 
political organisation in SEE did not solely emulate or gain inspiration from protest 
movements during the Arab Spring and the Indignant protests in Southern Europe, but 
also from student occupations in Serbia before the Global Recession of 2008 
(Reinprecht 2017). 
Most importantly, the cases of BiH and other parts of post-socialist Europe are 
on the frontline of that which activists and other citizens protested around the world 
since 2008 – the rapid marketisation / privatisation of public goods and spaces, 
predatory elites who benefit unfairly from the status quo, and increasing poverty and 
precarity. The rapid transformation to market economies in Eastern Europe (at the 
behest of the European Union and other international institutions), especially in urban 
areas, has made the consequences and feelings of grievance more intense than in other 
parts of Europe (Jacobsson 2015). 
At the core of the demands of citizens in post-2008 are appeals to justice 
underlining aspects of recognition and redistribution, in line with the conceptualisation 
by Fraser and Honneth (2003). The aspects of redistribution are clear: citizens sought to 
highlight and propose remedies for exploitation by the political elite (“1%”) at the 
expense of the public (“99%”). Crucially, participants in these mobilisations are not 
seeking recognition as “citizens” by the existing political and economic elite. They are 
making a radical claim whereby they are citizens who are themselves the legitimate 
“insiders” and agenda-setters, with the elite as “outsiders”. It is this rupture in the status 
quo, this tension of justice and legitimacy outside legality, that is the basis for Engin 
Isin’s (2009) “activist citizenship” that will form the conceptual foundation in this 
article. 
The article will next examine how citizenship is broadly understood, how it is 
linked to conventional political participation (“active citizenship”), and the radical 
critique by Isin (“activist citizenship”). The relationship between active and activist 
citizenship will be used to provide an exploratory framework for the subsequent 
analysis. The third section will provide background to electoral politics in BiH, and the 
protests in 2014. The subsequent section will summarise the electoral and demographic 
data used, link these to the differentiation between active and activist citizenship, and 
justify why the analysis is limited to the Bosniak- and Croat-predominant entity in BiH. 
Importantly, the analysis will use a difference-in-differences framework that allows for 
a causal interpretation of the link between the “treatment” (citizen assemblies) and 
outcomes in subsequent elections, that is, whether electoral change is an effect of the 
2014 plenums. Most importantly, the approach not only establishes whether citizen-led 
mobilisation in BiH had an effect on cantonal elections, but also the type of electoral 
change (i.e., which outcomes were affected), and whether the electoral change persisted 
beyond 2014. In short, the article explores whether activist citizenship affected active 
citizenship. 
From Active to Activist Citizenship 
The modern conceptualisation of liberal-democratic citizenship rests on the oft-cited 
distinction made by Marshall (1950, 10-1), between social, political, and civil elements. 
Social citizenship connotes the right to economic security and a standard of living 
similar to fellow citizens. The education system and social services are liked to social 
citizenship. Political citizenship implies two related rights, that of being able to partake 
in decision-making (i.e., political authority) as well as having opportunities to select 
those in political power. These are manifested in the institutions of electoral democracy 
and political representation. Finally, and most relevant for this study, civil citizenship is 
tied to rights guaranteeing individual freedoms, including liberty / autonomy of the 
individual, the right to private property, and right to justice. The right to justice is key to 
civil citizenship, and is central to this article. 
The concept of the “active citizen” is evident in the thinking of the Conservative 
government in Britain in the 1980s. In a series of commentaries, Douglas Hurd, then 
Home Secretary, attempted to reconcile the liberal commitment from the Right for a 
receding state with the Left commitment for forms of solidarity. For the Conservatives, 
the “active citizen” was one who became active in the running of their communities 
through voluntarism, thus having individual responsibility and voice instead of leaving 
this to the state. Schemes such as Care in the Community and Neighbourhood Watch 
were launched, which were designed to replace state-led mental / physical disability 
care and policing, respectively (Bellamy and Greenaway 1995, 474). Thus, the shift is 
away from the elements or rights of the citizen to one where the conditions of actual 
participation are emphasised. 
On the face of it, the notion of the “active citizen”, with its emphasis on local 
empowerment and social inclusion, seems compatible with social-democratic or left-
leaning perspectives of solidarity. However, this “active citizen” is, in fact, passive and 
often tasked with responsibilities in the private sphere encouraged top-down by the 
state, which Turner (1990) terms conservative citizenship in contrast with more bottom-
up, public manifestations of revolutionary citizenship. Crucially,  passive citizenship is 
where “the citizen is a mere subject rather than an active bearer of effective claims” 
(Turner 1990, 200). 
For example, informal caring responsibilities for children and elderly relatives in 
this conservative configuration fall disproportionately on women, leading to exclusion 
from full social citizenship (Lister 1990). Walby (1994, 386) posits that Marshall’s 
social citizenship requires being a paid worker, so “[w]omen’s caring work in the 
family is a major barrier to women’s full social citizenship” (391). Moreover, this 
erosion of social citizenship is deleterious to civil citizenship (which is the focus of this 
article), that is, exclusion due to the burden of informal caring also negatively affects a 
woman’s autonomy.  “Active citizenship” is thus a misnomer for passivity and 
disempowerment.    
Attempts to provide quantitative measures of active citizenship tend to assume 
that a good citizen is one who upholds the prevailing socio-political order rather than 
transform it. Hoskins and Mascherini (2009, 468) operationalise active citizenship along 
four axes: democratic values; representative democracy; community life; and protest 
and change. The first three dimensions have an obvious link to a perpetuation of the 
status quo. Adherence to democratic values is measured by respondents feeling it is 
important: to develop an independent (read: individualistic) opinion, vote, obey laws, 
and be active in conventional politics. Community life is akin to membership in 
community organisations and voluntarism. Supporting representative democracy is 
closely aligned with Marshall’s notion of political citizenship, with individuals’ 
commitment to: engaging with political parties, women’s political participation, and 
voting. The final dimension, protest and social change, leaves room for citizenship tied 
to “unconventional forms of participation”, including “protests, boycotts and political 
strikes” that are part and parcel of established democracies (Hoskins and Mascherini 
2009, 465). However, in measuring protest and social change, Hoskins and Mascherini 
(2009, 465) use cross-national survey data on respondents’ commitment to “improve 
things”, boycott products for ethical reasons, or take part in a lawful demonstration. 
This assumes that citizenship contains elements that remain behind closed doors. 
Hence, part of citizenship is encapsulated by what Scott (1990) calls “infra-politics”, 
which are the “hidden transcripts” of private rebellion and resistance. The other 
significant feature assumed in this measure of social change is that even in the act of 
protesting, demands for justice invoke, in Marshall’s words above, “the due process of 
law”. 
Such a conceptualisation of the link between citizenship and citizen-led dissent 
fails to capture the crucial function of performativity (that is, citizenship not behind 
closed doors), and the possibility that it can seek fundamental socio-political 
transformation. It is here that the notion of activist citizenship provides a conceptual 
framework to connect the “citizen” to social change. 
Isin (2008) starts with Foucault’s notion of subjectivation, which is how an 
entity constitutes itself as a moral / ethical being and thus becomes a “subject”. Isin 
(2012, 109) posited that Foucault, Deleuze, and other moral philosophers did not 
appreciate the revolutionary potential of citizen-making, and “were rarely, if at all, 
interested in political subjectivity as a performative force that breaks habits or ways of 
doing things and throws the subject into uncertainty, indeterminacy and the unknown”. 
Thus, rather than hidden micro-rebellions, constituting the citizen is 
performative (Isin 2017, 502-8), and problematizes the status quo by invoking 
prevailing conventions (e.g., “rights”) whilst exceeding or breaking conventions (e.g., 
“legality”). 
To address the misnomer of the passivity of the so-called “active citizen”,   Isin 
(2008, 38) distinguishes between the active and activist citizen: “[w]hile activist citizens 
engage in writing scripts and creating the  scene,  active  citizens  follow  scripts  and  
participate  in  scenes  that  are already created”. This process of a re-constitution of the 
political subject is done through performative “acts of citizenship”, which bring into 
being (“actualise”) citizens and not vice versa. 
Events across the globe since 2008 can be viewed as instances of activist 
citizenship, and through creative and visible acts, political subjects came into being and 
in particular, sought to re-constitute citizenship. At the organisational level, the 
mobilisations crystallised through horizontal, direct-democratic decision-making in 
occupied spaces or acampadas (della Porta 2015), which eschewed representatives from 
governmental, non-governmental, and partisan bodies, and instead emphasised 
individual access to a “shared space” (Ishkanian, Glasius, and Ali 2013). 
What is largely neglected in the extant literature is evidence of the connections 
between activist citizenship challenging the socio-political order, and active citizenship 
through voting. It is here that the current study is situated, as an exploratory 
investigation of the connection between active and activist citizenship at the municipal 
level. 
This distinction between active and activist citizenship allows for a critical 
assessment of the connections between the citizen, sites, and the duration of ‘acts of 
citizenship’ (Isin 2012, 131-5). The act in question, the constitution of plenums, asserts 
citizens’ authority to shape rights claims. Crucially, although the event of the plenum is 
temporally and spatially bounded, acts of citizenship are not. In other words, the effects 
and significance of the plenums extends beyond their duration (i.e., until May 2014) and 
location (e.g, National Theatre, Tuzla). The performance of mobilisation and direct 
democracy is not only for the immediate audience, but rather for all local citizens.  
In particular, if active citizenship is related to electoral engagement, then this 
can be observed through changes in turnout. Activist citizenship could also affect, on 
average, how citizens vote for ruling parties in subsequent elections, with or without 
concomitant changes in turnout. Thus, there are four combinations of average 
behaviours related to electoral disengagement and vote for ruling parties  after an 
episode of activist citizenship (e.g., plenums): 
 Null: there is no change in turnout or in vote for ruling parties  
 Alienation: there is change in turnout, but not in ruling party support. In other 
words, those who do not vote for ruling parties stop voting. 
 Substitution: there is no change in turnout, but less support for ruling parties. In 
other words, citizens continue to vote, but for non-ruling parties. 
 Transformation: there is a change in turnout and ruling party support. In other 
words, those who had supported ruling parties no longer do so and no longer 
vote. 
For alienation and transformation, citizens will seek to pursue politics by other 
means – and there will be a clear demarcation between active (electoral) and activist 
(non-electoral) citizen participation. 
The four possibilities are displayed in Table 1. 
The analysis below will examine which of these four scenarios is suggested by 
the aggregate municipal results in cantonal elections. Before proceeding to the analysis, 
it is instructive to provide background to politics in BiH. 
Politics, parties, and protests in BiH 
The complex institutions of BiH are due to its piecemeal creation as a result of the 
devastating wars of the 1990s. The Washington Agreement (1994) ceased hostilities 
between Bosniaks and Croats, and created a loose federation of ten ethnic-majority 
cantons (the Federation of BiH, or FBiH) co-ordinated by a power-sharing Bosniak / 
Croat executive, with Zagreb as guarantors. After sustained North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) air operations, parties to the conflict signed the US-brokered 
Dayton Agreement (1995) with Zagreb and Belgrade as guarantors, which secured the 
end of armed conflict amongst the belligerents. The state of BiH that was created 
consists of FBiH and Republika Srpska (RS), the latter a Serb-predominant territory. 
The resulting central governmental institutions have been weak, with little co-ordinating 
power, and “exist largely on paper” (ICG 1999, 3). 
Primary governing power is thus devolved to FBiH and RS, where Bosniaks 
have a numerical majority in the former and Serbs in the latter. The aforementioned 
cantons within FBiH, which are the focus of this article, enjoy far-reaching powers and 
have separate constitutions, governments, judiciaries, and extensive budgetary 
autonomy over key public services such as health and education. The lowest level of 
governance are municipalities. Additionally, the district of Brčko was disputed, and 
ruled by an international tribunal to be part of both RS and FBiH yet have independent 
local institutions. The governance of BiH is further complicated by the presence of the 
international community in the form of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), 
led by the High Representative. The High Representative largely had a monitoring role 
until 1997, but was given the so-called “Bonn Powers” to unilaterally remove elected 
officials and ratify legislation.1 
The constitution also contains safeguards to guarantee representation in elected 
office for the three constituent peoples of BiH – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Since the 
constitution was an annex to the Dayton Agreement and not negotiated by local 
stakeholders, it is sometimes seen as a case of “imposed federalism” (Keil 2013). 
Politics in BiH continues to be dictated by politicians promoting an “archetypal 
ethnocracy” (Hulsey and Stjepanović 2017) instead of a multi-ethnic democracy, since 
many of the leaders (or their parties) active during the wars of the 1990s are still pivotal 
in electoral politics. Electoral politics remains highly segmented along ethnic lines 
(Hulsey 2015), since ethno-nationalist leaders espouse a politics of fear, whereby voters 
are faced with an “ethnopolitical prisoners’ dilemma” (Hulsey and Mujkić 2010) or 
“strait-jacket” (Perry 2014) preventing a vote for civic or multi-ethnic parties. 
                                                 
1 An analysis of High Representative decisions 1997-2009 showed that the Bonn Powers were 
used 895 times, with removal / suspension from office (20%) and imposition of legislation 
related to judicial reform (20%) most frequent (Szewczyk 2010). However, between 2010 
and 2014, the High Representative only issued 48 decisions, 39 of which were to reverse the 
unilateral bans to hold public office issued by his predecessors (author’s own calculations), 
with no decisions at all 2015-2018. 
The main Serb party in BiH is the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 
(SNSD) led by Milorad Dodik. Although it was oriented initially as a social-democratic 
party, Dodik and SNSD have opted for a more nationalist trajectory in recent years. 
Alija Izetbegović, the wartime President of BiH, founded the Party for 
Democratic Action (SDA) in 1990. SDA remains the main Bosniak party in FBiH, 
though a series of splits have made it less powerful over the years. For example, Haris 
Silajdžić, the wartime Prime Minister of BiH, broke with Izetbegović in 1996 and 
founded the Party for BiH (Stranka za BiH, SzBiH). More recently, new parties or blocs 
led by ex-SDA members contested the 2018 elections, such as Nezavisni blok and 
Narod   i   Pravda (Andjelić 2018).  
The Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), also 
established in 1990, is the main Bosnian Croat political party and linked to HDZ in 
Croatia, particularly during the rule of Franjo Tuđman, the first President of Croatia 
(Manning 2008, 85). HDZ BiH splintered in 2006, with the establishment of HDZ 1990 
which resisted constitutional reform. Although HDZ 1990 portrays itself sometimes as 
more nationalist and other times as reformist than HDZ BiH, the two parties are 
ideologically similar (Subotić 2016, 130), and even signed a recent cooperative 
agreement (N1 2019). 
The Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP) was the successor party to the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. SDP represents the only “multi-ethnic” 
alternative for Bosniaks and Croats with a credible chance of securing office in many 
parts of FBiH. 
Although different parties have gained and lost support over the years, such as 
the decline of SzBiH and local successes of the small, multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan Naša 
Stranka, the focus of the analysis below is on the predominant cantonal parties in FBiH 
in 2010, which were SDA, SDP, and HDZ, to chart their electoral fortunes before and 
after the 2014 protests. 
Despite the ethno-territorial fragmentation of post-war politics in FBiH 
described above, there have been occasional episodes of citizen-led mobilisation across 
ethnic boundaries. In February 2008, 17-year-old Denis Mrnjavac was stabbed and 
killed by three other youths on a Sarajevo tram. Since there were insufficient 
correctional facilities, the three suspects were released (Latal 2009). This led to a 
number of public demonstrations mainly in Sarajevo focused on the juvenile justice 
system and societal violence more generally. The mobilisation initially organised by 
NGOs Dosta! (“Enough!”) and Grozd (“Grape”)  - though a majority of the participants 
were ordinary citizens - called for the resignation of the cantonal government. The 
protestors co-ordinated through a “loose collective” called Građani Sarajeva (“Citizens 
of Sarajevo”), which later became Akcija Građana (“Citizens’ Action”). What is 
important is that not only was this the first notable non-ethnic mobilisation in post-war 
BiH, but also the importance of framing and empowering the “citizen” (Touquet 2015). 
The 2013 protests around unique ID numbers for Bosnian citizens (Jedinstveni 
matični broj građana or JMBG) originated in 2011 with a Bosnian Supreme Court 
decision that required state-level lawmakers to amend the current legislation within six 
months. JMBG is necessary to obtain important administrative documents, including a 
passport. However, the state-level parliament could not agree on the amended 
legislation, since politicians from RS wanted JMBG numbers to reflect the entity-level 
division of BiH whilst those from FBiH did not. In 2013, the law on JMBG lapsed due 
to the continued impasse, and as a result, the BiH Constitutional Court suspended the 
issuing of new registration numbers after February 2013. This decision had real, human 
consequences. Citizen mobilisation (dubbed the “Baby Revolution”) urging legislators 
to pass the ID legislation crystallised in June 2013 around the case of Belmina Ibrišević, 
whose parents sent an urgent appeal since their infant daughter needed specialist care in 
Germany but was unable to obtain a passport (Štiks 2013). Crucially, the mobilisation 
provided an opportunity for people to constitute a common non-ethnic identity, since 
the dispute centred around RS attempts for JMBG to reflect the country’s ethno-
territorial division. Ethno-national leaders thus “inadvertently gave a political meaning 
to what they strived to destroy, namely the common citizenship [emphasis added] of all 
Bosnians and Herzegovinians” (Štiks 2013). 
The February 2014 mobilisation, which is the focus of this article, was triggered 
after the closure of five privatised factories in the city of Tuzla: Dita, Konjuh, Polihem, 
Poliochem, and Resod Guming. The redundant workers, joined by other local citizens, 
protested in front of local government buildings demanding wages owed and pension 
payments (Jukic 2014). Through social media and personal networks, news of the 
mobilisation spread and a number of protests began across the country. Although the 
protests were initially around specific economic grievances regarding factory closures 
one north-eastern Bosnian city, the scope of the protests began to encompass broader 
socio-political grievances, particularly a powerful critique of a corrupt political class 
(Lai 2016, 371). 
Some of these demonstrations became violent, but eventually, direct-democratic 
citizen assemblies (called “plenums”) were established in 22 towns and cities. The 
decision-making of these plenums relied on one-person-one-vote, and eschewed 
associational affiliation, much like the Indignant movements in Southern Europe (della 
Porta 2015). The primary objective of the plenums was to deliver a number of citizen 
demands to the local government. Under pressure from this mobilisation, the SDA 
Prime Ministers of the Tuzla, Una-Sana, Sarajevo, and Zenica-Doboj Cantons resigned 
(Klix.ba 2014). In the analysis below, cantonal election results are used, since plenum 
demands were directed at elites at this tier of governance. Since this study focuses on 
cantons, which are only in FBiH, the parties analysed below will be the predominant 
parties in the entity in the 2010 election: SDA, HDZ, and SDP. 
Some commentators reacted to the events in BiH as representing “new politics” 
(Arsenijević 2015; Gilbert and Mujanović 2015), a civic “counter-power” (Mujkić 
2015), or a “Bosnian Spring” (Mujanović 2014). 
At the heart of the protests and resulting plenums was, as mentioned above, 
economic grievance that ceded to political critique and calls for social justice (Kurtović 
2015; Lai 2016). Echoing the framing of earlier civic protests in BiH, the subject of the 
good active citizen who votes and is law-abiding, was transformed into the activist 
citizen who protests and is empowered to claim rights. For example, in Tuzla, the 
demands were “put forward by the workers and citizens of the Tuzla Canton, for the 
good of all of us”.2  The plenum demands contained calls for both retributive and 
distributive justice. Almost all plenums urged the resignation of their respective 
cantonal governments, such as the demand in Bihać: “Resignation and replacement of 
the Una-Sana Canton (USC) government and all directors of public institutions and 
public enterprises”.3  Plenums also included demands more closely related to 
                                                 
2 English translation of Tuzla Workers’ and Citizens’ Declaration, BiH Protest Files, 7 February 
2014. Available at: https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/declaration-of-citizens-
and-workers-in-tuzla-1/ 
3 English translation of Bihac Citizen Demands, BiH Protest Files, 10 February 2014. Available 
at: https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/bihac-citizens-demands-bihac-1/ 
redistribution, for example, the establishment of a public kitchen in Bugojno to feed 
poor people.4  
Despite the first instance of geographically widespread citizen-led mobilisation 
in post-war BiH and the resignations, the plenums ceased their activities within months. 
Moreover, it was unclear whether the events of early 2014 left any activist legacy (Keil 
and Perry 2015, 3). In the cantonal elections in October 2014, the predominant ethno-
national parties, HDZ and SDA, won the most seats in Croat-majority and Bosniak-
majority cantons respectively, with SDP losing votes (Bieber 2014). The predominance 
of the main ethnic parties was repeated in the 2018 elections, though the 
aforementioned splintering of SDA impeded the party’s ability to build coalitions 
(Andjelić 2018).  In sum, these results demonstrated “that Bosnian politics remains 
dominated by elite-centred parties, which often have little if any ideological profile” 
(Keil and Perry 2015). However, these analyses did not take into account existing 
electoral trends within locales to examine whether the plenums affected the trajectory of 
electoral outcomes in cantonal elections. This is the focus of the present analysis. 
Data and modelling 
Using the official results published on the BiH Electoral Commission website, 
municipal-level vote-shares for all political parties, as well as the number of registered 
voters and invalid votes, were collected for the FBiH Cantonal Assembly elections in 
2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018. Cantonal assembly elections are held every four years, 
                                                 
4 English translation of Second Bugojno Citizens’ Plenum: Declaration, BiH Protest Files, 13 
February 2014. Available at: https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/second-
bugojno-citizens-plenum-declaration/ 
concurrently with entity-level and state-level elections.5 As with other Bosnian 
legislative elections, seat allocation is based on an open-list proportional representation 
system. The data are disaggregated to the municipal level, since it is the lowest level at 
which electoral and demographic data, as well locations of citizen mobilisations, are all 
readily available. 
The electoral data were merged with the information from Karamehmedovic 
(2014), who compiled a list of the citizen initiatives that issued demands to political 
elites. Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Srebrenica are in RS, and Brčko has its own local 
governance structures, and they are thus excluded from the analysis since they are not 
municipalities within a canton (i.e., there are cantonal assemblies only in FBiH). 
Furthermore, since Sarajevo is comprised of four municipalities that are close together, 
it was assumed that electoral results in Centar Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad 
Sarajevo, and Stari Grad Sarajevo would potentially be affected by the Sarajevo 
plenum. Thus, there are 21 municipalities included in this study.6   
To explore whether there is evidence of a causal link between the 2014 plenums 
(“activist citizenship”) and voting behaviour in cantonal elections (“active citizenship”), 
a difference-in-differences approach (DID) will be used. Crucial to DID is the “parallel 
trends” assumption. That is, in the absence of the treatment, the difference in the 
outcome between the two groups (i.e., municipalities that did and did not have plenums 
                                                 
5 Local elections for municipal / city councils and mayors are also every four years, but shifted 
by two years (i.e., 2008, 2012, and 2016). 
6 Bihać; Bugojno; Cazin; Fojnica; Goražde; Gračanica; Kalesija; Konjic; Lukavac; Mostar; 
Novi Travnik; Odžak; Orašje; Travnik; Tuzla; Zavidovići; Zenica; Stari Grad Sarajevo; 
Novo Sarajevo; Novi Grad Sarajevo; and Centar Sarajevo. 
in 2014) is the same before “treatment” and would remain the same in the absence of 
treatment. Since there have been two elections since the plenums, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors will use the form used by Autor 
(2003) to estimate the expected difference in outcomes for each election, between 
municipalities with and without plenums: 
  yst = γs + λt + δDs + θDs*λt + X′stβ + εst (1) 
where s is the unit of interest (that is, municipalities in FBiH), t is the period 
(that is, 2006, 2010, 2014, or 2018), and ε is the error term. The response variable y is 
the outcome of interest, which will either be related to the vote-shares for political 
parties, excluded (i.e., invalid or blank) votes, or turnout. The outcome variables are all 
interval-level variables. The parameter λ combines the unobserved across-municipality 
year effects, and will be included in the models as year dummy variables. Time-
invariant municipal-level characteristics are included in the parameter γ. This allows us 
to account for cross-municipality variation, and thus isolate within-municipality 
variation in interpreting the results. Although the parameter γ accounts for time-
invariant traits at the municipality level, the analysis may still be confounded by 
municipal-level factors that vary over time, denoted by the vector X′β in the regression 
equation above.  
To control for possible time-varying confounders, municipal-level data were 
collected from the annual reports by the FBiH Institute for Development Programming 
(FZZPR) for 2007, 2010, 2014, and 2017 (FZZPR 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018). There are 
no FZZPR data for 2006 and 2018, so the closest years were used as a proxy. Since the 
initial trigger for the protests were linked to economic grievances, that is, the closure of 
the privatised factories and worker redundancies, it is important to try to capture 
changes in levels of economic grievance within a municipality, which could in turn 
affect voting behaviour.  
Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of grievance at the municipal level 
amongst available data sources, such as repeated cross-section / panel public opinion 
surveys. Two variables are included as proxies for economic grievance in the analysis 
below: unemployment rate and average salary. The former variable is measured by 
including all individuals who are unemployed or employed as the denominator 
(“economically active”). The salary variable is included to capture under-employment. 
That is, individuals could be employed, but the average pay in a municipality could be 
low, which may trigger economic grievances. However, the absolute salary does not 
capture the differences in cost of living across FBiH. Hence, the FZZPR also uses a 
measure of salary relative to the FBiH average as a way of measuring relative change in 
mean salaries, which will be used below. 
It could be argued that using individual-level data are preferable to aggregated 
municipal-level data. Micro-level analyses can specifically examine whether 
individuals’ electoral behaviours are significantly affected on average due to 
participation in activist citizenship. However, extant micro-level quantitative studies are 
constrained in that they often collect data from those participating in demonstrations in 
real-time, and thus there is no data on non-participants (e.g., Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). 
Other authors have attempted to use the timing of general surveys to capture the 
differences between protestors and non-protestors during waves of protests, for 
example, using the 2012 of the European Social Survey (ESS) (e.g., Tătar 2015). 
However, ESS asked whether respondents have been involved in lawful public 
demonstrations. However, this definition is at odds with activist citizenship, in which 
legality is not the guiding principle, but rather justice: the occupations of the squares in 
Greece, Spain, and other public spaces around the world were not pre-approved “legal” 
demonstrations. On a more practical level, it is far less demanding for resources to 
collect publicly available electoral data rather than conduct large repeated surveys. The 
latter cannot reliably collect information about past electoral behaviour (unlike the use 
of aggregated municipal-level data). 
The “treatment” in the current study is denoted with the dummy variable D, 
which is the existence of a plenum. D takes the value of 1 for municipalities that had 
plenums in 2014, and is set to 0 for all other municipalities. Plenums are treated as an 
experimental stimulus, since they were established and disbanded at nearly the same 
time in 2014. Moreover, according to contemporary accounts, the mobilisation of the 
protests and organisation of the plenums was unexpected, so there would not be 
anticipatory changes in voting behaviour. 
For the analysis below, the parameter of central interest is θ, for the interaction 
between year and whether there was a plenum in 2014. The last election before the 
plenums, 2010, is used as a baseline, so the resulting coefficients are interpreted as the 
expected difference in the outcome variable between plenum and non-plenum 
municipalities in a given year compared with 2010. Thus, for the parallel trends 
assumption to hold, this expected difference in 2006 should be the same as for 2010, 
that is, θ2006 = 0. In other words, to establish causal evidence, the expected difference 
between plenum and non-plenum municipalities should not change before the plenums 
were established in 2014. Moreover, if the plenums did have an electoral effect, it 
would be expected that at least one of the other coefficients (i.e., θ2014 or θ2018) are non-
zero. This modelling setup allows us to examine whether there is evidence of an 
electoral effect in 2014, and also whether evidence of electoral change persisted in 
2018. This will be analysed in the next section for each of the outcome variables of 
interest.  
The descriptive statistics by year, depending on whether there was a plenum in 
2014, are included in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
Results and discussion 
The regression results for SDP, SDA, and HDZ votes shares, along with turnout 
and percentage of excluded votes, are presented in Table 2. The coefficients for SDA 
shows that, ceteris paribus, the vote share is lower in 2010 than in 2006, that is, before 
the plenums. By including data from the local elections in 2008 and 2012, and running a 
year and municipal fixed-effects model, it is evident that the difference in SDA vote 
share between plenum and non-plenum municipalities has remained stable, with a dip in 
2010 compared with other years (see Figure A2 in the appendix). One reason for this 
dip was the splintering of SDA, with the newly formed centrist Union for a Better 
Future BiH (SBB) polling well in urban Bosniak areas – which is also the profile of 
where most of the plenums were established. The coefficients for 2006 are not 
significantly different from zero for HDZ and SDP, so there is evidence parallel trends 
assumption is satisfied for these outcome variables but not for the SDA. 
 The coefficients for turnout and excluded votes remain close to zero across 
years and not statistically significant at the 5% level, which suggests that the difference 
between plenum and non-plenum municipalities has stayed, ceteris paribus, constant 
across election years and there is little evidence of an effect. Turning to the vote share 
for the parties, for HDZ, the coefficients are negative and significant (at the 5% level) in 
2014 and 2018, meaning eroding support in plenum compared with non-plenum 
municipalities. HDZ performed 2.68 points worse in in 2014 in plenum versus non-
plenum municipalities, and 3.79 points worse in 2018, compared with 2010. In other 
words, HDZ fared even worse in plenum municipalities versus non-plenum 
municipalities in 2014 and 2018, compared with 2010 (before the protests).  
There is also evidence of a statistically significant negative electoral effect for 
SDP in 2014, which persisted in 2018 (see Table 2). The difference between SDP vote 
share in plenum and non-plenum municipalities was 7.78 points lower in 2014 and 5.59 
points lower in 2018, meaning that the party has done relatively worse in plenum 
municipalities compared to 2010. Although the effect attenuated in 2018, it remained 
significant. As with the above discussion on the SDA, these results could be confounded 
by a party split. Željko Komšić split from the SDP in 2012 and established the 
Democratic Front (DF), which ran on a non-ethnic platform and appealed to moderate 
Croats and Bosniaks who might otherwise vote SDP. To check this, the analysis was 
rerun combining DF and SDP vote shares for 2014 and 2018 (see Table 2, Model SDP-
DF). Though the coefficients change, the conclusions remain the same.  
In terms of the conceptual framework developed above, there is evidence of 
substitution for both SDP and HDZ. That is, neither turnout nor excluded votes changed 
due to the plenums, but SDP and HDZ voters opted for other electoral choices. In other 
words, voters continued to be “active citizens” by remaining engaged with the electoral 
process and voted for non-SDP and non-HDZ alternatives. Although it was not possible 
to conduct DID for SDA, Figure A2 suggests that, with the exception of 2010, the 
difference between plenum and non-plenum municipalities in party vote share was quite 
stable 2006-2018. In other words, there seems to be a null effect for SDA. 
The results for both SDA and HDZ are intriguing. The extant literature 
concludes that though the framing of the mobilisation was “non-ethnic”, plenums 
flourished in Bosniak-predominant locales either due to less commitment to the 
institutions by Croats and Serbs (who have kin-states through which they can become 
dual citizens) (Kostovicova 2014), as well as internal repression by Croat elites in 
Croat-dominant areas in FBiH like Mostar (Murtagh 2016). However, SDA vote share 
seemed to be unaffected whilst there was a decrease on average in HDZ support after 
the plenums. 
Given that the 2014 protests and subsequent plenums are seen as the first 
instance of widespread non-ethnic citizen-led mobilisation since the end of the 1990s 
wars, it is also surprising that support decreased for the SDP. That is, the protests / 
plenums critiqued ethno-national partisan politics, yet seem linked to an average 
electoral punishment for the main multi-ethnic party in BiH. This is all the more 
unexpected given that a similar analysis of post-protest municipal elections found that 
the Bosniak SDA vote share was reduced in places where plenums were established, 
and increased for Naša Stranka (Sircar 2017). 
One possible explanation for the SDP result is that on average, citizens sought 
justice not by specifically punishing ethno-national political parties, but rather parties 
with the highest support in the previous pre-plenum election. Using 2013 census data 
(BHAS 2016), it is evident that in FBiH, municipalities that established plenums 
occurred primarily in places with a comfortable Bosniak majority. Only Odžak and 
Orašje have Croat majorities, whilst Mostar and Novi Travnik have similar numbers of 
Bosniaks and Croats. The other municipalities that established plenums were more than 
60% Bosniak. Thus, for citizens in municipalities with plenums, Bosniaks were more 
likely to have voted SDP in 2010, particularly in the five Bosniak-majority cantons 
where SDP had the highest vote share (see Table 3). On the other hand Croat voters 
tended to seek alternatives to HDZ in places with plenums.    
Conclusion 
The above analysis shows how the wave of protests and subsequent direct-democratic 
activity in FBiH with citizens framed and empowered as claimants of rights and justice, 
i.e., activist citizenship, affected certain electoral outcomes in cantonal elections, i.e., 
active citizenship. The case of cantonal elections are relevant to the study of Bosnian 
politics, since they are the responsible level of governance in FBiH for housing, 
education, and other sectors linked to distributive justice. 
The citizen-led mobilisation in FBiH articulated demands for distributive justice 
and empowered the political subject of the citizen, not unlike occurrences in other 
countries in the wake of the 2008 global recession. What is important is that these 
events did not represent a shift towards anti-political behaviour, of disengagement or 
undermining of electoral processes. Rather, political participation in conventional and 
unconventional ways are linked, and citizen assemblies demanding wholesale systemic 
changes did not lead to citizens sacrificing their electoral voices. 
Of course, it is necessary to interpret these results cautiously, since aggregate-
level differences are not tantamount to findings related to individual behaviour. The 
tentative conclusion from the above analysis is that places in which citizens issued 
demands through direct-democratic methods were those that, on average, electorally 
punished SDP and HDZ, the leading vote-getters amongst Bosniaks and Croats, 
respectively, in 2010.  
Most importantly, the above study shows that, contrary to contemporary and 
subsequent analyses, the plenums have had a persistent negative electoral effect on 
certain parties in FBiH. Methodologically, the DID framework allows for an estimate of 
whether there is an electoral effect and whether it lasted beyond one electoral cycle. 
This article shows that even under the most difficult circumstances, such as the post-
authoritarian and post-conflict setting of BiH, where elites wield substantial formal and 
informal power and citizens rarely protest, it is still possible for citizen-led mobilisation 
to trigger electoral change. 
This begs the question whether this type of electoral effect after episodes of 
activist citizenship can be estimated in other contexts, particularly where extant 
analyses have (wrongly) concluded that there was no lasting effect. For example, 
similar investigations can be conducted in other places to see whether the types of 
multi-site mobilisations with calls for systemic (distributive) justice, such as those after 
2008 in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, are linked to significant electoral effects. This 
would help reassess the true long-term electoral impact of citizen-led mobilisations in 
these places,  and provide insights  more generally regarding citizens’ attempts to 
fundamentally transform politics through activism. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics by year and whether plenum established 
 non-plenum plenum 
 N mean sd min max N mean sd min max 
2006           
% unemp. 58 54.34 12.51 26.00 90.40 21 48.74 13.39 15.70 77.60 
Salary pct. 58 86.48 10.81 63.90 122.00 21 95.22 21.22 65.80 140.50 
Turnout % 58 56.04 8.78 36.52 75.48 21 55.23 4.91 46.36 63.68 
Excluded % 58 9.01 3.57 1.61 18.65 21 8.65 2.24 2.50 12.36 
SDP % 58 9.18 7.19 0.00 29.32 21 17.82 9.51 2.14 37.03 
HDZ % 47 16.21 16.85 0.00 53.43 16 9.26 11.44 0.11 40.06 
SDA % 54 24.24 16.22 0.00 66.19 21 26.15 10.33 2.24 51.01 
           
2010           
% unemp. 58 52.74 12.59 26.53 81.65 21 47.27 13.05 15.64 75.29 
Salary pct. 58 88.56 13.66 68.20 133.00 21 95.02 19.54 66.10 141.20 
Turnout % 58 57.28 9.32 33.80 79.48 21 56.89 4.36 47.40 68.06 
Excluded % 58 6.07 1.88 1.60 10.94 21 6.29 0.58 5.02 7.86 
SDP % 58 14.66 11.88 0.00 46.02 21 25.40 9.32 1.87 39.56 
HDZ % 58 17.87 21.16 0.00 62.13 21 8.82 12.77 0.00 46.82 
SDA % 58 19.56 16.27 0.00 64.65 21 19.03 6.31 5.84 30.66 
           
2014           
% unemp. 58 54.46 12.17 27.40 81.40 21 47.81 13.45 16.00 72.40 
Salary pct. 58 88.55 14.92 62.90 131.70 21 93.78 21.57 62.90 147.70 
Turnout % 58 53.17 11.12 18.67 78.73 21 53.55 5.51 41.41 64.15 
Excluded % 58 7.47 2.28 2.72 13.67 21 7.64 1.08 6.09 10.74 
SDP % 58 8.75 7.69 0.00 35.20 21 11.86 5.76 1.76 21.70 
HDZ % 58 20.03 23.68 0.00 75.99 21 8.41 12.33 0.00 44.32 
SDA % 58 23.37 17.55 0.00 76.84 21 25.55 7.42 7.85 36.99 
DF % 
 
58 7.10 6.46 0.00 22.55 21 10.84 5.26 1.64 19.31 
2018           
% unemp. 58 50.27 12.08 25.48 79.56 21 44.03 12.29 15.05 67.17 
Salary pct. 58 89.98 16.42 63.00 149.00 21 95.90 20.75 68.00 141.00 
Turnout % 58 52.47 11.14 29.55 77.68 21 52.69 6.90 39.03 66.48 
Excluded % 58 7.27 2.49 1.65 13.94 21 7.10 1.46 4.79 10.86 
SDP % 58 10.80 11.19 0.00 53.04 21 16.03 9.48 0.88 35.93 

























Figure A2. Coefficients for plenum x year for SDA vote share 2006-2018 with 95% 




Table 1. Observable electoral changes linking active and activist citizenship. 
 
 Ruling party support 
No change Change 
Lower turnout No change null substitution 
Change alienation transformation 
 
  
Table 2. Coefficients for plenum x year for party vote shares, turnout, and excluded 
votes (baseline: 2010) 
 
Variable Turnout Excluded SDA HDZ SDP SDP-DF 
       
plenum x year       
Yes x 2006 -0.320 -0.537 4.084 3.030 -1.938 -1.878 
 1.078 0.667 1.911 1.851 1.898 1.796 
 0.767 0.421 0.034 0.103 0.308 0.297 
       
Yes x 2014 0.641 -0.017 2.461 -2.678 -7.782 -4.035 
 0.874 0.395 1.459 1.303 1.762 1.690 
 0.464 0.966 0.093 0.041 0.000 0.018 
       
Yes x 2018 0.536 -0.356 1.958 -3.794 -5.593 -3.914 
 0.946 0.442 2.318 1.784 1.820 1.796 
 0.571 0.422 0.399 0.035 0.002 0.030 
       
R2 0.898 0.581 0.852 0.934 0.799 0.817 
N 316 316 308 297 316 316 
Muni. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Avg. Salary Percentile yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
The coefficient, robust standard error, and two-sided p-value (of the corresponding t-
test statistic) are reported. 
  
Table 3. Canton name, ethnic majority, and 2010 cantonal election vote shares 
 
Canton Majority SDA HDZ SDP 
Una-Sana Canton  Bosniak 22.70 0.77 23.59 
Posavina Canton  Croat 11.00 40.02 5.98 
Tuzla Canton  Bosniak 25.45 3.01 30.67 
Zenica-Doboj Canton  Bosniak 24.81 5.12 25.60 
Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Bosniak 21.47 - 24.79 
Central Bosnia Canton  Mixed 17.89 20.68 17.79 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton  Mixed 16.86 29.46 15.34 
West Herzegovina Canton  Croat - 51.42 0.82 
Sarajevo Canton  Bosniak 17.94 1.05 24.17 
Canton 10 Croat 5.58 26.15 4.52 
Note: Hyphen (-) denotes where a party did not run 
